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Psychology has been historically plagued by the under-reporting of both replications and null findings. The avoidance
of these core ingredients of scientific practice means that the psychology literature is unquestionably distorted. The
bias in psychology is pervasive and systemic, afflicting researchers, reviewers, editors and journals, all of whom are wed
to pursuing the novel and the curious at the expense of the reliable. Psychology therefore operates in a manner that is
askew of other sciences, with the links between replicability and believability seemingly much weaker. Additional
problems follow from the distorted way that psychology currently operates - including spinning findings, publication
bias, and sadly, outright fraud. Such problems represent a serious challenge for psychologists to get their
house-in-order – and one step is to make sure that replications and null findings find a home in psychology rather
than remain our dirty little secrets that further eat away at the credibility of our science.“. . .if the goal of scientific research is to render
established truths, then the neglect of replication must be
viewed as scientific irresponsibility” (Smith, [1], p.971).
“But Professor Laws, our findings are negative and so
we don’t have much to write about” Anyone who has
taught a psychology lab will have heard a variant of this
phrase innumerable times. The corollary is usually a dis-
cussion containing the obligatory reference to “. . .our
results would/could/should be significant if we had
tested more participants”. This aversion to the null hy-
pothesis (or so-called negative findings) is by no means
new to psychology, and “. . .is arguably one of the most
pernicious and unscientific aspects of modern social science.”
(Fergusson & Heene [2], p.4). Most ominously though,
psychology seems to fare worse than many other disci-
plines, has done for a long time, and has done little to
rectify this situation.
Psychological knowledge is not acquired a priori - we
cannot know in advance what will emerge as reliable fin-
dings without replicating initial findings. Nevertheless, as
Hartshorne & Schachner [3] note “. . .replicability is not
systematically considered in measuring paper, researcher,Correspondence: k.laws@herts.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orand journal quality. As a result, the current incentive struc-
ture rewards the publication of non-replicable findings”
(p3 my italics). Indeed, psychologists have received criti-
cism for being overly-fixated on the kudos attached to the
pursuit of novelty; and the publishing of highly counter-
intuitive, sometimes career-making controversial papers in
high-impact journals - which are themselves symbiotically
wed to pursuing the glamorous and the curious. Like any
science, psychology has few identifiable destinations, but
many routes and many cul-de-sacs and as a creative enter-
prise, psychologists will produce unexpected and even
seemingly untenable results. Part of the scientific process
is unquestionably to generate new knowledge, models and
change our ‘world view’, but in doing so, to accurately
delineate reliable from unreliable findings partly through
the analysis of their replicability.
Humans are, however, inclined to seek out information
that confirms rather than falsifies or refutes their beliefs.
Contrary to Sir Karl Popper’s passionate advocacy of falsi-
fication, confirmation bias is the all-too-human tendency
to seek results that confirm our pre-existing beliefs and
knowledge systems. Ironically, most of what we know
about confirmation bias comes from psychology, yet our
discipline is amongst the worst offenders in this regard -
with psychologists tending to more favourably rate results
that conform to their prior expectations than people in
other disciplines (Hergovich et al. [4]). Moreover, this
represents no real change from earlier analyses of theis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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1970s (Goodstein & Brazis, [5]) – psychology tells us psy-
chologists are confirmist conformists - preferring to seek
positive evidence in favour of their pet theories.
Despite the negativity about ‘negativity’, null results are as
fundamental to the advancement of science as attention-
grabbing positive results - whether one has a Popperian
view of science or not. Likewise, replications are fundamen-
tal to science – even leading psychologists to propose the
somewhat impractical notion that all experiments should
be replicated before publication (Lykken, [6]). The debate
over both null findings and replications is thrown into relief
with evidence of publication bias (against negative results)
being regularly documented in meta-analyses. Given the
human capacity for generating ideas and an exponentially
increasing number of scientific papers published, the claim
by John Ioannidis [7] claim that “most published research
findings are false” seems quite plausible. Negative findings
and replications are science’s road signs telling us how to
moderate our journey – we may like to ignore them or find
them frustrating, but they are vital to progress - and con-
trary to existing trends, journals must allocate more space
and importance to both null findings and replications.
Acceptance and rejection
The moral of this story is that the finding of statistical
significance is perhaps the least important attribute of
a good experiment; it is never a sufficient condition for
concluding that a theory has been corroborated, that a
useful empirical fact has been established with
reasonable confidence—or that an experimental report
ought to be published. Lykken ([6] p 158)
For a paper to be published, or even submitted, depends
largely on how the results fare against the ‘ontological
mystique’ of the p <.05 level (Rosnow & Rosenthal, [8]).
Naturally, many results do not pass the ‘interocular trau-
matic test’ (Edwards, Lindman & Savage, [9]) or, in plain
terms, hit you right between the eyes. But as Edwards
et al. say “the enthusiast's interocular trauma may be the
skeptic's random error. . . [and] A little arithmetic to verify
the extent of the trauma can yield great peace of mind for
little cost” (p.217).
The inference revolution that took place in psychology
between 1940 and 1955 led to inferential statistics and p
values becoming de rigueur (Gigerenzer & Murray, [10]).
The percentage of articles published in American Psy-
chological Association (APA) journals that used statis-
tical tests rose from 17% in the 1920s to almost 90% by
the 1960s; and although near ceiling, has continued to
rise: 91.7% for the 1970s, 92.6% for the 1980s, and 93.9%
for 1990 to 1998 (Hubbard & Ryann, [11]). As soon as
significance testing appeared, however, criticism began(see Boring [12]), has continued and led some even
to describe statistical testing as psychology’s “dirty little
secret” (Lambdin [13]).
Nevertheless, one upside of being tied to the p<.05
cut-off is that we can readily estimate if expected num-
bers of papers are attaining and missing this benchmark.
Examining 165 articles in four major APA experimental
psychology journals published between 1986–7, Sterling
et al. [14] reported that while most (94.3%) used signifi-
cance tests, crucially the vast majority rejected the null
hypothesis (93.5%). Moreover, not much had changed
from Sterling’s comparable analysis in 1959, where
97.3% of papers published in four major psychology
journals reported statistically significant outcomes for
their major hypotheses. By contrast, although 94.3% of
psychology articles used significance tests in 1986–7,
only 69.2% of articles in medical journals did so and
while most rejected the null hypothesis, it was not as
often as in psychology journals (95.6 vs. 85.4%). So, psy-
chologists not only more commonly use statistical tests
than medics, but more frequently reject the null hypoth-
esis and have been consistently doing so for some time.
Bias – a systemic problem in Psychology
“This violent bias of classical procedures [against the
null hypothesis] is not an unmitigated disaster. Many
null hypotheses tested by classical procedures are
scientifically preposterous, not worthy of a moment's
credence even as approximations. If a hypothesis is
preposterous to start with, no amount of bias against it
can be too great. On the other hand, if it is preposterous
to start with, why test it?” Edwards (1965, p 402)
The bias against publishing negative findings in psycho-
logy means that they remain unknown to other investiga-
tors. Worse though is the likelihood that negative findings
are independently replicated and each is unpublished, un-
til eventually by chance - one study obtains a spurious sig-
nificant effect and is published. Like a moth to a star, such
findings attract attention – especially since such false posi-
tives are also quite likely to be counter-intuitive and
unusual. By contrast, when researchers do manage to pub-
lish null findings, they typically arrive with little or no fan-
fare and at a much slower pace than positive outcomes
(Ioannidis et al. [15]). Hence, negative findings are not
only less common, but when they are published their
impact on the literature is weakened.
But where is the bias occurring? The answer is - at
multiple levels. Some psychology journals and editors
even express a policy of not publishing replications re-
gardless of whether the outcome is positive or negative.
This was thrown into relief by the furore surrounding
Daryl Bem’s ‘Feeling the Future’ paper (2011) purporting
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paper making such claims could be published in a high
impact mainstream psychology journal. I do not, however,
share this concern since the paper was peer-reviewed and
deemed appropriate by the editor. Nor do I subscribe to
the somewhat anti-science view of Edwards (1965) quoted
above, that some hypotheses are too preposterous to test.
For me, the importance of Bem’s paper has nothing to do
with whether we believe in his demonstration of psychic
ability, but how such studies perform an important self-
assessment checking function for psychologists. As the
authors (Ritchie, Wiseman & French [16]) of a replication
attempt state, this study raises issues about “. . .our current
statistical paradigm, the policies of academic journal pub-
lishing, and what exactly a scientist needs to do to con-
vince the world that a surprising finding is true”. Two
salutary lessons from this episode are: first, that no matter
how many times one author documents something in a
paper (and Bem had 9 experiments), the work requires
independent replication; and second, the difficulty resear-
chers typically experience when trying to publish replica-
tions. As noted, some journals do not publish replications,
including that which published the Bem study. Although
Ritchie et als ‘failed’ replication (and we need a better de-
scriptor than this) found a good home, it may not have or
like many other non-replications – hidden away in a less
well read and lower impact journal, which is a travesty–
remarkable though false findings inhabiting palaces, while
the truth resides in ghettos. Entirely consistent with such
notions, we know that highly cited papers are less likely to
replicate (Ioannidis, [7]) and that publication bias seems
to affect high-impact journals more severely (Ioannidis,
[7]; Munafò et al., [17]).
We might wonder if psychologists view replications
differently from scientists in other disciplines? Francis
[18] has contentiously argued that for psychologists, the
link between replication and belief in a phenomenon is
not as strongly correlated as in other sciences. Francis
highlights the Bem [19] study as an example of one
where the paper contains multiple replications of a
phenomenon and yet we don’t believe it, while other
phenomena do not so readily replicate (e.g. bystander
apathy) but we do believe in them! Though of course,
the former is replication within the same lab as opposed
to replications across labs – and this is a key difference.
Nonetheless, Francis bleakly concludes that “The scien-
tific method is supposed to be able to reveal truths about
the world, and the reliability of empirical findings is sup-
posed to be the final arbiter of science; but this method
does not seem to work in experimental psychology as it is
currently practiced.”
Strong editorial bias undeniably exists against publi-
shing direct replications. In a survey of 79 editors of social
science journals, 94% indicated that replication studieswere not encouraged in the editorial policy (Neuliep &
Crandall [20] p. 87). Seventy-two per cent preferred to pub-
lish studies claiming novel findings rather than replications.
In a parallel survey of reviewers for social science journals
(Neuliep & Crandall, [21]), 54% stated a preference for new
findings than replications, arguing that the latter were “Not
newsworthy” or even a “Waste of space”. Despite the biased
attitude of editors and reviewers for social science journals,
the situation is somewhat different in the natural sciences.
Madden, Easley, and Dunn [22] compared the attitude
toward replications between editors of journals from the
social and the natural sciences. Whereas the comments of
the editors from the social sciences journals are similar to
the ones reported by Neuliep and Crandall [20] the natural
science journal editors present a more varied though more
positive picture, with comments ranging from “Replication
without some novelty is not accepted” to “Replication is
rarely an issue for us . . . since we publish them.”
To complete a triptych alongside the bias of editors
and reviewers, we must add researchers themselves.
While an associate editor of the Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology (JPSP) during a 3-month period,
Greenwald [23] conducted a survey of reviewers and
authors. Remarkably, Greenwald found that researchers
were eight times more likely to submit a manuscript for
publication if the results were positive rather than nega-
tive. In a similar survey Coursol and Wagner [24] sent
questionnaires to 1000 APA members involved in psy-
chological therapeutic outcome research. Of 609 respon-
dents, the decision to submit a paper for publication was
significantly related to the outcome. When studies had
positive outcomes (i.e. clients improved) 82% submitted
their paper, but with negative outcomes (client did not
improve) only 43% submitted their articles. Furthermore,
of studies reporting a positive outcome 66% were pub-
lished, while only 22% of the neutral/negative outcome
studies were published i.e. leaving 78% unpublished! (for
similar conclusions from a recent meta analysis, see
Hopewell et al. [25]).
Despite the bias, more replications probably do exist in
the literature than is commonly believed. Researchers tend
to notice only exact replications, but most are in fact par-
tial or conceptual replications i.e., where researchers typi-
cally ‘tweak’ the methods of previous studies (Neuliep &
Crandall [26]). In the most recent analysis of this issue,
Makel, Plucker & Hegerty [27] examined 500 randomly
selected articles from the top 100 psychology journals
since 1900 - to find that just 1.6% of publications were
replications. Of these, only 14% were direct replications
that follow the original 'experimental recipes’, while the
vast majority were conceptual replications that test related
hypotheses using different methods and settings
Even when replicating, many authors refrain from even
using the word ‘replication’ in a title possibly through
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being sufficiently original) Indeed, the word ‘replication’
appears in the titles of psychology articles now as little
as it did 15 years ago (<50 times per year), although it
does appear three times as often in psychology abstracts
(though again the number is not increasing) – sugges-
ting some reticence on the part of researchers to ‘out’
their replications.
Flash-bang-wallop science: Two scientists are racing for
the sake of all mankind
Although the origins and consequences of publication
bias have been debated over decades, this bias continues
to increase. Pautasso [28] examined the phrase ‘non-
significant difference’ in abstracts over 40 years and
found a decrease through time in the ratio of non-
significant-to-significant results reported in the natural,
medical and social sciences. Fanelli [29] examined the
actual outcome (rather than the abstract) in over 4600
publications from different countries and disciplines and
found strong evidence for a steady and significant in-
crease in publication bias across time. The frequency of
papers declaring significant statistical support for their a
priori formulated hypotheses increased by 22% between
1990 and 2007 alone. Crucially, however, psychology and
psychiatry were the worst offenders (amongst 19 disci-
plines) being especially prone to the bias of publishing
positive findings – being five times more likely to report
a positive result than space sciences (which were at the
other end of the spectrum).
The attraction to the novel is underscored by increased
use of the somewhat grand phrase ‘paradigm shift’ in ar-
ticle titles. This phrase, derived from Thomas Kuhn’s The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions [30] directly or indi-
rectly implies a seismic change in how we view some
major phenomenon. In this context, Atkin [31] noted the
use of paradigm shift in titles pointing out how it had
increased to 30 instances per year by 2001. A quick ana-
lysis of the subsequent period 2002–2012 by myself
revealed over 1400 instances and a clear year-on-year in-
crease (with 77 in 2003 and 198 in 2011). Although most
instances occur in medicine, psychology has over 70 ar-
ticle titles containing this grandiose phrase in the past
9 years – in Kuhnian terms, it is unlikely that psychology
has experienced one paradigm shift nevermind 70 re-
cently. In conjunction with the reduction of null findings
and simple replications, it seems that scientists are driven
to make grandiose claims about their own work.
With the ever-increasing numbers of academic papers
published annually, many more psychologists now actively
promote their papers to hopefully raise them above the col-
ossal mass. The promotion of science should be a key ven-
ture of scientists, however, it does raise the spectre of spin.
Yavchitz et al. [32] examined spin in scientific papers andpress releases. From 498 press releases in the EurekAlert
database (December 2009 to March 2010) they extracted
all two-arm, parallel-group RCTs (n = 70) for analysis. De-
fining ‘spin’ as “. . .specific reporting strategies (intentional
or unintentional) emphasizing the beneficial effect of the
experimental treatment”, they identified spin in 40% of ar-
ticle abstract conclusions and in 47% of press releases.
Examining the moderating effect of: journal type, funding
source, sample size, type of treatment (drug or other),
results of the primary outcomes, press release author and
the presence of ‘spin’ in the abstract, the only factor asso-
ciated with “spin” in the press release was “spin” in the ar-
ticle abstract. Furthermore, 21 (51%) of the associated
news stories were reported with ‘spin’ mainly the same as
that as identified in the press release and article abstract
conclusions. Although some scientists may find that jour-
nalists misrepresent their findings, some scientists wilfully
participate in what we might euphemistically call the over-
zealous promotion of their work (or themselves).
Alongside career-based factors, a publish or perish cul-
ture and the growing allure of media profiles for scien-
tists, the bias in psychology against null findings and
replications not only bias the literature, but may lead to
a small minority of psychologists to engage in question-
able practices - and several recent high profile cases ac-
cord with this impression. Fanelli [33] found that 1.97%
of scientists admitted to having fabricated, falsified or
modified data or results at least once and up to 33.7%
admitted other questionable research practices. In sur-
veys asking about the behaviour of colleagues, rates were
14.12% for falsification, and up to 72% for other ques-
tionable research practices. Turning specifically to psy-
chologists, John, Lowenstein & Prelec [34] surveyed
‘questionable research practices’ (QRPs) in almost 6000
academic American psychologists. The researchers asked
the questions using a method that attempts to make
people more honest, in part by giving them an incentive
to tell the truth. They found that a surprising number of
psychologists had engaged in questionable research prac-
tices. Based on the anonymous replies from 2155, the
majority were guilty of selectively reporting studies that
‘worked’ (67%), failing to report all dependent measures
(74%), continuing to collect data to reach a significant
result (71%), reporting unexpected findings as expected
(54%: so-called HARKing – see below), and excluding
data post-hoc (58%). Approximately 35% indicated that
they had doubts about the integrity of their own re-
search on at least one occasion. And 1.7% admitted to
having faked their data. Interestingly, the highest rates of
QRPs emerged for those working in cognitive, neurosci-
ence, and social disciplines, and among researchers using
behavioural, experimental, and lab-based methodologies.
John et al. conclude that “the prevalence of QRPs raises
questions about the credibility of research findings and
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elegant results that may be difficult to match without en-
gaging in such practices oneself. This can lead to a “race to
the bottom,” with questionable research begetting even more
questionable research.” (p.8). In this respect, Questionable
Research Practices may be the academic equivalent of
‘performance enhancers’, used by those who feel they
need that ‘something extra’ to compete with high per-
forming competitors.
Meta-analysis, the Grey Literature and the File Drawer
problem
With the rising tide of studies being published, we look
increasingly to meta-analyses to quantitatively summarise
literatures for us. Unsurprisingly, the number of meta-
analyses has increased exponentially, with over 5600
papers the phrase ‘meta-analysis’ in the title published last
year (2012).
Meta-analysis is based on quantitatively summarising
findings that are accessible in the literature and this largely
(though not exclusively) means published works. We
could, however, try to locate data from unpublished studies
– the so-called Grey Literature. Again, however, it seems
that psychology may not fare so well. A Franco-Dutch
study (Schöpfel et al. [35], Farace et al. [36]) analysed 64
scientometric articles published between 1987 and 2005,
citing several thousands references, to estimate the propor-
tion of grey literature cited in different disciplines. While
engineering sciences had 39–42%, Education 14–19%, bio-
logy 5–13; however, at the bottom of the barrel again, we
find psychology with 3% and Psychiatry with 1%.
Nonetheless, the grey literature may introduce its own
biases. Unpublished studies located by authors are likely
to reflect a small sub-sample of all unpublished studies
given the difficulties with tracking down such informa-
tion currently e.g. with unregistered trials. Although
Dickersin et al. [37] reported that the grey literature may
be more a result of failure to write up results rather than
the rejection of submitted manuscripts, doubts about
quality prevail. An analysis of 60 meta-analyses that
included published and unpublished trials found that
unpublished trials were less likely to conceal interven-
tion allocation adequately and to blind outcome assess-
ments (Egger [38]). Unpublished and published research
also differs because investigators halt studies at prelimi-
nary stages when data do not favour the experimental
treatment (Dickersin, Chan, Chalmers, Sacks, & Smith,
[37]). Unpublished research is more likely to have small
samples, which may reflect pilot projects, difficult-to
recruit subjects, or highly innovative interventions. In a
similar fashion, Lipsey and Wilson [39], in a meta-
analysis of 92 meta-analyses of outcome research in the
areas of psychotherapy and education, found that the
average effect size was 0.53 and 0.39 for published andunpublished research, respectively (for examples from
drug efficacy, see Hart, Lundh and Bero 2012). Some
discrepancy exists between the willingness of authors
and editors to include grey literature. For example, Cook
et al. [40] assessed attitudes toward inclusion of unpub-
lished data in meta-analyses and found a clear majority
in favour amongst the authors of 150 meta-analyses
(78%), but interestingly journal editors were far less
convinced (47%).
Ferguson and Brannick [2] examined 91 meta-analyses
published in American Psychological Association and Asso-
ciation for Psychological Science journals for the methods
used to identify and control for publication bias. Of the 91
studies, 70% made some effort to analyze publication bias,
and 41% reported finding evidence of bias. In an effort to
control publication bias, 63% of studies attempted to find
unpublished studies. The authors conclude that “. . .many
meta-analyses in psychology exhibit both asymmetric fun-
nel plots and small enough summary effects to appear
fragile in the presence of publication bias” (p.126). Sur-
prisingly, however, those meta-analyses that included un-
published studies were just as likely to find evidence for
publication bias as those that did not. Authors of meta-
analyses were themselves overrepresented in unpublished
studies acquired, leading. Ferguson and Brannick to ar-
gue that searches for unpublished studies may actually
increase rather than decrease some sources of bias (see also
Rothstein and Bushman [41]; Fergusson & Heene, [2]).
In contrast to narrative reviews, meta analysis both fo-
cuses on and attempts to estimate publication bias. In
1979, Rosenthal argued that “The extreme view of the
"file drawer problem" is that journals are filled with the
5% of the studies that show Type I errors, while the
file drawers are filled with the 95% of the studies that
show nonsignificant results” (p.638). Although Ioannidis
(2006) proposed that “most published findings are false”,
we should not ignore the possibility that many unpub-
lished findings are true. Nobody knows how many nega-
tive studies are tucked-away in a file-drawer; however,
statistical techniques derived for use with meta-analysis
allow us to estimate the file-drawer effect (for a clear
overview of the various techniques for assessing publica-
tion bias, see Møller & Jennions, [42]).
Despite fears about missing unpublished studies, tech-
niques aligned to meta analysis do now permit an estimate
of the number of missing effect sizes, their direction and
even how large those missing effect might be. The stan-
dard way to look for bias in a meta-analysis is to examine
funnel plots of the individual study effect sizes plotted
against for example, their sample sizes or the standard
errors. When no bias exists, studies with larger samples
and smaller error will cluster around the mean effect size.
By contrast, smaller samples and greater error variance
produce far more variable effect sizes (in the tails). Ideally,
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shape, with smaller studies producing greater variability in
effect size outcomes.
Crucially, we can impute missing values to see how it
changes the overall effect size in a meta-analysis. This
method, known as trim and fill was devised by Duval
and Tweedie [43] and is based on adding studies to a
funnel plot until it becomes symmetrical. Smaller studies
are omitted until the funnel plot is symmetrical (trim-
ming) and the trimmed funnel plot is used to estimate
the true “centre” of the funnel; and then the omitted
studies and their missing “counterparts” around the
centre are replaced (filling). This provides a more accu-
rate estimate for an adjusted effect size that includes the
“filled” studies. A recent study that used the trim and fill
method to analyse 48 meta-analyses, from the Cochrane
Database of Systematic Reviews, estimated that 56% had
at least one study missing whereas the number of mis-
sing studies in 10 was statistically significant and in four
reviews, would lead to significant changes in the conclu-
sions (3 that were significant became nonsignificant and
one that was nonsignificant became significant).
Power, null findings and meta-analysis
Among the many virtues that have been extolled for
meta-analysis, the main appeal is that it can convert
existing things into something better. “Significance” can
be attained statistically when small group sizes are
pooled into big ones (Feinstein, [44], p. 71).
Statistical power refers to the probability that the test
will reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis
is false (or in other words, the probability of not making
a Type II error). Underpowered studies, waste resources
as they lack the power needed to reject the null hypoth-
esis. While underpowered studies fail to detect genuine
effects, the converse – in an overpowered study, essen-
tially trivial effects may become significant. So, we skate
somewhere between profligacy and triviality (and some-
times blindly as initial power calculations are often not
performed). Given the high rates of rejecting the null hy-
pothesis in psychology (Sterling [14]), this profusion of
positive outcomes is even more striking given the size of
effect detected and the fact that studies are often under-
powered). In this context, Rossi [45] calculated power
for 6,155 statistical tests in 221 journal articles published
in the 1982 volumes of the Journal of Abnormal Psych-
ology, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, and
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. The power
to detect small, medium, and large effects was .17, .57,
and .83, respectively. The average statistical power for
medium effect sizes had hardly varied from the estimate
of .48 given by Cohen (1962) almost 30 years earlier (seealso Sedelmeir and Gigerenzer [46]). This worrying sce-
nario is emphasised by Schmidt and Hunter [47] who
reported that with “0.50 as a rough average . . .This level
of accuracy is so low that it could be achieved just by
flipping a (unbiased) coin!” (p. 40). Unsurprisingly, this
had led some to have serious reservations about the
published literature and especially about the potentially
artefactual nature of some controversial findings (Rossi [48]).
The cocktail of low power, small effects and a high rejection
of the null hypothesis, undoubtedly means many findings will
be unreliable.
Of course the lack of power in studies inevitably leads to
speculation that larger studies/ trials are required to estab-
lish an effect. Decisions about whether additional studies
are warranted is often a moot point especially since a ma-
jority (e.g. streptokinase: Lau et al. [49]) or even all nega-
tive (null) findings in a meta-analysis may produce an
overall significant effect size. A recent example an overall
significant effect emerges in meta-analysis despite each in-
dividual study being nonsignificant would be the use of
LSD to treat alcoholism (Krebs & Johansen, [50]). Egger
and colleagues have written extensively on the unreliabil-
ity of conclusions in meta-analyses where small numbers
of nonsignificant trials are pooled to produce significant
effects [51].Losing our religion
One thing we have learned from meta-analysis is that ef-
fect sizes often diminish with time – the purported decline
effect – leading some to even suggest the equivalent of the
Heisenberg Principle at play (with observers no longer
being naïve when observing the phenomenon under inves-
tigation: Schooler, [52]). One reason is that study-quality
or experimental techniques e.g. neuroimaging typically re-
fine and improve over time. A classic example concerns
the initial CT studies reporting greater ventricle brain
ratios in people with schizophrenia; however, the diffe-
rence shrank and shrank until regression analysis was pre-
dicting that ventricle-brain ratios would soon be larger in
controls than patients (van Horn &McManus, [53]). This
shrinking effect size is a pervasive effect – it occurs
whether one is looking at modern brain imaging tech-
niques, medicine, psychological therapy or regular expe-
rimental psychology studies.
Hyped ‘major’ findings emerge initially with large
effects and small samples (as we have seen), only to
shrink as time progresses. One problem is that meta-
analytic validation of an effect “is not seen as necessary
to proclaim an effect reliable. Textbooks, press reports, and
narrative reviews often rest conclusions on single influential
articles rather than insisting on a replication across inde-
pendent labs and multiple contexts” (Giner-Sorolla [54],
p 564, my italics).
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Issues relating to replicability combined with recent exam-
ples of blatant fraud have re-focused the already hovering
spotlight on the credibility of psychological science. Pashler
& Wagemnakers [55] recently remarked that psychology
is perhaps finding itself to be “. . .the public face for the
replicability problems of science in the early 21st cen-
tury, [and] psychological science has the opportunity to
rise to the occasion and provide leadership in finding
better ways to overcome bias and error in science gener-
ally.” (p.529). This leadership will however require
psychologists to take a more active role in submitting
replications and null findings – science is clearly not
self-correcting. (Pashler & Harris [56]).
Although some individuals are culpable, many of the
problems in psychology are systemic. Psychology may be
fortunate (or unfortunate) to have uncovered so few
rogues and as in any sphere of life, some will always
exist. Increased vigilance needs to be married with sys-
temic changes and although we cannot rectify every
issue immediately, we may begin to address some, in-
cluding the problem of ‘negative’ results. Although some
specialist replication and null journals have appeared,
they have either not lasted very long (e.g. in the late 70s,
the journal Replications in Social Psychology stopped
after three volumes) or have continued and with modest
outputs (Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hy-
pothesis has published just over 30 papers in over 10
years). Although laudable, such journals create a special
space for replications and null findings rather than ac-
knowledging their place in the centre of science. Turn-
ing to our approach at BMC Psychology, it is journal
policy to publish work- deemed by peer reviewers “. . .to
be a coherent and sound addition to scientific knowledge
and to put less emphasis on interest levels, provided that
the research constitutes a useful contribution to the
field.” This remit unquestionably includes the consider-
ation of null results and replications and the more cen-
tral roles they need to play in the discipline. Journal
editors have previously tried to provide directives to en-
courage replications, but this alone may even be coun-
ter-productive. For example, Evanschitzky et al. [57]
reported that the drive to publish replications in marke-
ting journals had actually led to a 50% reduction in repli-
cations published. We must acknowledge that while
providing a home for replications and null findings,
researchers must change their mentality. . ..as they say,
the ball is in your court!
Studies return negative results for many reasons inclu-
ding a lack of statistical power and thus researchers should
routinely report effect sizes to evaluate this possibility. As
we have seen, publication bias distorts meta-analytic
reviews especially where the probability of locating studies
reflects the strength and direction of the findings– whichmay be extensive in some cases. Statistical adjustments are
helpful, but they too depend upon the selection of published
studies made by the analyst, which itself may misrepresent
the available published data. Searching the grey literature is
also helpful, but again has its own biases. Neither statistical
estimations of bias nor trawling unpublished studies ultim-
ately addresses the underlying issue – most negative find-
ings remain unpublished but more need to be so.
The systemic cultural bias exhibited by editors, reviewers
and authors against negative findings undoubtedly has a
further subtle, but pernicious outcome when authors do
publish negative findings. Some simply downplay or fail to
mention their negative findings, overuse phrases such as
‘nonsignificant trend’ or worse, may try to reframe as
negative results as positive. Some may avoid having totally
negative results through what has become known as
HARKing (Kerr, [58]): Hypothesizing After the Results are
Known. This is where researchers represent their hypo-
theses as coming prior to results, when in fact they came
after the results and were aligned to fit. A recent spoof ar-
ticle (though perhaps closer to tragedy than comedy)
argued that a priori scientific hypothesizing is the most
reliable form of precognition because so few psychology
papers state hypotheses that turn out to be disconfirmed
(Bones, [59]). We cannot avoid the conclusion that psy-
chologists, editors, and reviewers have consistently con-
spired to deny the existence of negative results and the
importance of replication – these are Psychology’s dirty
little secrets. . . that we need to change.
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